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RESPECTING THE “GUARDIANS OF NATURE:” CHILE’S
VIOLATIONS OF THE DIAGUITA INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE NEED TO
ENFORCE OBLIGATIONS TO OBTAIN FREE, PRIOR, AND
INFORMED CONSENT
Cynthia Vel*
INTRODUCTION
On the 20th anniversary of the International Year of the World’s
Indigenous Peoples,1 Chile’s Diaguita Huascoaltino community celebrated
a victory for indigenous peoples’ rights,2 but not before enduring almost
twenty years of repeated human rights violations. Despite having specific
protections carved out under international human rights laws, the Diaguita
experienced serious infringements of their international rights at the hands
of the national government and one of the largest gold producers in the
world.
Despite the wide range of domestic and international laws
protecting the rights of Chile’s indigenous peoples, the Diaguita found
these rights challenged when Canadian mining giant, Barrick Gold,
through its subsidiary Nevada Mining Co., began constructing the world’s
largest open pit mine, Pascua Lama, on lands historically belonging to the

* J.D. Candidate, December 2014, Florida A&M University College of Law; B.A.,
University of Central Florida. Special thanks to Randall S. Abate, Associate Professor of
Law and Director of the Center for International Law and Justice at Florida A&M
University College of Law, for his invaluable guidance and support in the preparation of
this article.
1

Living History: Inauguration of the International Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples,
3 TRANS NAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 168 (1993).
2
Sarah Tory, Chilean Court Rules in Favor of Suspension of Pascua-Lama Mine, THE
SANTIAGO TIMES (July 15, 2013), http://santiagotimes.cl/chilean-court-rules-in-favor-ofsuspension-of-pascua-lama/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
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indigenous community. 3 With the approval of the Pascua Lama mining
project, Chile violated the Diaguita community’s international and domestic
rights, including the right to free, prior, and informed consent and the right
to property and natural resources. This case illustrates the problem
Chile’s indigenous peoples face: the existing bodies of domestic law have
been unable to adequately enforce the rights of the indigenous peoples in
Chile, opening the door for the continued damage and depletion of already
scarce natural resources. Chile must address this problem by modeling
Venezuela’s and Peru’s legal frameworks and implementing domestic
laws that will enforce its international obligations as well as encourage the
compliance of the private sector.
Located in Northern Chile’s Huasco Valley, the Diaguita
Huascoaltinos are a silvopastoral community. As such, they rely on the
herding of goats and mules, in addition to small scale farming as a means
of survival.4 Between the 1500s, when the Spaniards arrived in the
Huasco Valley, and the early 2000s, the Diaguita community was largely
an unrecognized group in Chilean society. 5 In 2006, the Chilean
government enacted Law No. 20.117, recognizing the “existence and
cultural attributes of the Diaguita ethnicity and the indigenous nature of the
Diaguita people.”6 With their status as indigenous peoples solidified, the
Diaguita community is now entitled to the special protections afforded to
Chile’s indigenous peoples under its domestic laws.
In the international realm, various treaties and declarations
recognize and extend specific rights to the indigenous and tribal peoples.
These instruments outline protections ranging from the right to property
and natural resources in the American Convention on Human Rights to
3

Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos & Their Members v. Chile, Petition 415/07,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 141/09, ¶ 7 (2009), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2009eng/Chile415.05eng.htm (last visited May 15,
2015) [hereinafter Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos].
4
Id. at ¶ 3.
5
Nancy Yañez & Sarah Rea, The Valley of Gold, 30.4 LAND & RES.S AM.’S (June 9,
2010), http://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/chile/valleygold (last visited Apr. 6, 2014) [hereinafter The Valley of Gold].
6
Id. (citing Law No. 20.117, Agosto 28, 2006, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile)).
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the right to self-determination in the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). For these rights and other rights
to be fully respected, they depend on the fulfillment of the obligation to
obtain free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). International Labour
Organization Convention 169 (ILO Convention 169) extends this right to
consultation to indigenous peoples. However, ILO Convention 169, like
other international instruments, relies on implementation and enforcement
to occur on the domestic level, which often results in an “implementation
gap.”7
Part I of this article will discuss the impact of Barrick Gold’s Pascua
Lama mining project on the Diaguita Huascoaltino community; and how
the country’s failure to consult with the community before approving the
project resulted in water contamination, violations of property rights, and
depletion of the community’s natural resources. Part II describes the
international legal framework that currently addresses the human rights of
indigenous peoples, as well as Chile’s domestic laws regulating the
environment and mining projects.
Part III proposes that Chile consider aspects of successful legal
frameworks of other Latin American countries and implement domestic
laws to fulfill the international obligations of FPIC and implement
educational measures that compel private extraction companies to adhere
to the FPIC process. By implementing this proposal Chile will enforce the
rights of its indigenous peoples, and prevent the public and private sectors
from continuing to destroy and deplete the indigenous peoples’ scarce
natural resources.

7

Alexandra R. Harrington, Don’t Mind the Gap: The Rise of Individual Complaint
Mechanisms Within International Human Rights Treaties, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
153, 153 (2012).

643

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

I.

Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014

THE DIAGUITA HUASCOALTINOS AND THE PASCUA LAMA MINE

Chile’s Huasco Valley is one of the most arid regions in the world. 8
Located along the Huasco River, the valley is the main source of water for
the Diaguita people. 9 The river, measuring 700 miles in length, is fed by
two tributaries and several glaciers.10 As a result of climate change and
local mining activity, these glaciers are now limited both in size and in
number.11 The Diaguita community depends on the Huasco River to
maintain its traditional way of life. 12 Any reduction or contamination of its
water source would result in a dramatic socio-cultural impact on the
community’s customs and traditions. 13
The Diaguitas’ claim to the Huasco Valley originated from the
Juzcado de Letras de Vallenar, in March 1902.14 This judgment granted
legal title through adverse possession to persons occupying a parcel of
land immemorial, thus legitimizing the Diaguitas’ possession of their
traditional lands in 1903. 15 Between 1903 and 1993, when Chile passed
amendment No. 19.233 Ley de Comunidades Agricolas (Law of
Agricultural Communities), the Diaguitas encountered challenges to their
property rights as local farmers produced subsequent titles, bereft of legal
value, and claimed ownership of the property. 16 The 1993 legislation
allowed the Diaguita community to once again register and retain title to its
8

SUSTAINABLE DEV. STRATEGIES GRP., REPORT: CURRENT ISSUES IN THE CHILEAN MINING
SECTOR 8 (2010), available at http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/10-10-08CHILE-REPORT.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).
9
The Valley of Gold, supra note 5.
10
Id.
11
Lindsey Nicholson et al., Glacier Inventory of the Upper Huasco Valley, Norte Chico,
Chile: Glacier Characteristics, Glacier Change and Comparison with Central Chile, 50
ANNALS GLAC. 111, 117 (2009), available at http://lindseynicholson.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/Nicholson-et-al..-2010.-Annals-Of-Glaciology.-Glacier-inventoryof-the-upper-Huasco-valley-Norte-Chico-Chile-glacier-characteristics-glacier-change-andcomparison-with-central-Chil.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).
12
Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 14.
13
Id.
14
IVAN PIZARRO ET AL, EL VALLE DE LOS NATURALES: UNA MIRADA HISTÓRICA AL PUEBLO
DIAGUITA HUASCOALTINO [THE VALLEY OF THE NATIVES: A HISTORY OF THE DIAGUITA
HUASCOALTINO PEOPLE] 3 (2006) [hereinafter VALLEY OF THE NATIVES].
15
Id.
16
Id. at 99-100.
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land in 1997, this time as an agricultural community. 17 Chile had not yet
recognized the Diaguita as indigenous peoples in 1993, and this law was
intended to protect the lands of agricultural communities that did not fall
within the protections of Chile’s indigenous laws.18 Unfortunately, this law
failed to protect the community’s title and served as the genesis of the
current controversy facing the indigenous community.
As a result of the 1997 registration, the Diaguita Huascoaltinos
ultimately lost a significant portion of their land to the fraudulent title
holders.19 One parcel of land in particular was eventually sold to Nevada
Mining Co, Barrick Gold’s subsidiary in Chile, and is now the location of
the Pascua Lama mining project.20 A small group of Diaguita, and an
individual landowner, subsequently filed civil suits against Barrick
challenging the land transfers. 21 Both suits, however, were decided in
favor of Barrick, and the plans to construct the open pit mine moved
forward.22
A.

Procedural History of the Dispute

Public disproval of the Pascua Lama mining project began early on
when Barrick Gold submitted an environmental impact assessment (EIA)
to Chile’s regional environmental commission (COREMA). 23 The EIA
requires companies and project owners to disclose all adverse
consequences the proposed project will have on the environment, as well
as on human life.24 Where injurious ramifications are identified, such as
the displacement of the community or a significant disturbance to the
17

Law No. 19.233, Julio 21, 1993, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O] (Chile).
VALLEY OF THE NATIVES, supra note 14, at 112-3.
19
Id. at 113.
20
Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos supra note 3, at ¶ 8.
21
NANCY YAÑEZ, LAS IMPLICANCIAS DEL PROYECTO MINERO PASCUA LAMA DESDE LA
PERSPECTIVA DE LOS DERECHOS INDÍGENAS [THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PASCUA LAMA MINING
PROJECT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS] 2 ( 2005) [hereinafter
IMPLICATIONS OF PASCUA LAMA]; Steve Anderson, Chile Appeals Courts in Favor of Barrick
Gold, THE SANTIAGO TIMES (Oct. 3, 2007), http://santiagotimes.cl/chile-appeals-court-infavor-of-barrick-gold/ (last visited May 19, 2014).
22
IMPLICATIONS OF PASCUA LAMA, supra note 21, 7-8.
23
Id. at 3.
24
Id. at 5.
18
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community’s customs and way of life, the company must define the
measures that will be taken to mitigate or redress the damage. 25 Public
dissension followed the approval of Barrick Gold’s EIA because the study
failed to disclose that the Pascua Lama ore deposits were located
underneath three Andean glaciers.26 For the barren, desert-like Huasco
Valley, these glaciers and the water they supply are an essential element
to the Diaguita Huascoaltino agricultural way of life. 27
In response to this initial submission, COREMA returned the
environmental study to Barrick Gold, noting its failure to describe the
destruction of the three glaciers as a result of the project, and instructed
the mining company to evaluate the impact of its activities on the glaciers
with a higher level of precision before resubmitting a detailed report
describing the measures that will be taken to mitigate the damage. 28
Barrick Gold complied, submitting plans to use explosives and bulldozers
to remove thirteen hectares of ice from the Esperanza, Toro I, and Toro II
glaciers,29 transporting them by truck, before dumping the ice onto another
glacier.30 Dissatisfied with this proposal, COREMA again returned the
study to Barrick Gold, requesting additional information regarding the
impact of the mine on the Esperanza, Toro I, and Toro II glaciers, but

25

Id.
SUSTAINABLE DEV. STRATEGIES GRP, supra note 8.
27
Raimundo Pérez Larrain, El caso Pascua Lama: los Huascoaltinos y el derecho
humano al agua in GLOBALIZACIÓN, DERECHOS HUMANOS, Y PUEBLOS INDÍGENAS 409, 420-1
(2008), available at
http://www.observatorio.cl/sites/default/files/biblioteca/GLOBALIZACION,%20DERECHO
S%20HUMANOS%20Y%20PUEBLOS%20INDIGENAS.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014).
28
COMISION REGIONAL DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE REGION DE ATACAMA, INFORME CONSOLIDADO
DE SOLICITUD DE ACLARACIONES, RECTIFICACIONES Y AMPLIACIONES AL ESTUDIO DE IMPACTO
AMBIENTAL DEL PROYECTO 065/2000 “PASCUA LAMA” DE LA COMPAÑIA MINERA NEVADA, S.A.,
5 (2000), available at
http://seia.sea.gob.cl/expediente/expedientesEvaluacion.php?modo=ficha&id_expediente
=3053 (last visited May 19, 2014).
29
Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 11.
30
IMPLICATIONS OF PASCUA LAMA, supra note 21, at 11.
26
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ultimately approved the EIA on the condition that Barrick Gold resubmit a
detailed glacier management plan.31
In 2004, Barrick Gold submitted a modified EIA, expanding its plan
for Pascua Lama further into Diaguita territory, and again proposing to
remove large portions of ice from the three glaciers. 32 In response,
COREMA rejected Barrick Gold’s plan to remove the glaciers, and
presented it with a detailed study of ways the company could prevent and
mitigate environmental damage. 33 After allegations surfaced that they had
manipulated scientific studies to reflect findings that the Toro I, Toro II,
and Esperanza glaciers were, in fact, not glaciers and only large ice
reserves,34 Barrick Gold presented a new proposal explaining that the
three glaciers would not be “removed, relocated, destroyed or physically
affected”35 during the course of the mineral extraction and the project
would not impact the quality of the Huasco Valley’s water. 36 Despite
public opposition, COREMA granted final approval of the Pascua Lama
project on the condition that Barrick Gold could not remove any of the
three glaciers, and that it had to construct a water management system. 37
After receiving the long-awaited approval from COREMA, a dispute
in tax obligations between Chile and Argentina,38 and challenges to the
31

Daniela Estrada, Conflict Over Andean Glaciers Heats Up, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS
AGENCY (Nov. 12, 2005), http://www.ipsnews.net/2005/11/environment-chile-conflict-overandean-glaciers-heats-up/ (last visited May 19, 2014) [hereinafter Estrada, Conflict Heats
Up].
32
Id.
33
Emily Byrne, Chile’s Environmental Commission Opposes Glacier Removal Plan, THE
SANTIAGO TIMES (June 1, 2005), http://santiagotimes.cl/chiles-environmental-commissionopposes-glacier-removal-plan/ (last visited May 19, 2015).
34
Estrada, Conflict Heats Up, supra note 31.
35
Daniela Estrada, Activists Try to Block Start of Pascua Lama Mine, INTER PRESS SERV.
NEWS AGENCY (May 18, 2009), http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/05/environment-chileactivists-try-to-block-start-of-pascua-lama-mine/ (last visited May 19, 2014) [hereinafter
Estrada, Activists].
36
Id.
37
Wanda Prassmsma, Chile Gives Pascua Lama Condition Green Light, THE SANTIAGO
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2006), http://santiagotimes.cl/chile-gives-pascua-lama-conditional-greenlight/ (last visited May 19, 2014).
38
Construction of Pascua Lama was placed on hold when a tax dispute arose between
Chile and Argentina. Unable to agree on how to divide the tax revenues from the mining
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project’s approval39 forced Barrick to put the construction of the mine on
hold. During this period, the Diaguita Huascoaltinos filed a petition with
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights challenging the
ownership of the land used for the Pascua Lama mine and alleging
violations of their rights under international law.
B.

Nature of the Diaguita Huascoaltinos’ Claims Against
Chile

The Diaguita Huascoaltinos’ petition went before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights on December 30, 2009. 40 The indigenous
community’s claims against Chile were based on rights protected under
the American Convention on Human Rights41 and Article 34 of Chile’s
1993 Indigenous Law N° 19.253.42 The community alleged violations of its
rights to property, consultations, and participation; interference with the
practice of their customs and traditional way of life; and deprivations of
their ability to provide food for themselves and make a living.43 Following
this petition, the Commission deemed the following claims admissible and
approved the Diaguita Huascoaltinos’ petition. 44

project, the countries engaged in discussions for over two years. Argentina and Chile
eventually determined that mining profits would be taxed by the country in which they
were produced, as well as how and by which country “transborder services” would be
taxed. Pav Jordan, Chile, Argentina nearing Pascua Lama Tax Deal, REUTERS (Jan. 29,
2009), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/01/29/idUKN2931258920090129?sp=true (last
visited Apr. 6, 2014); Victoria Bolf, Tax Dispute Delays Chile’s Pascua Lama Mine, THE
SANTIAGO TIMES (Jan. 3, 2008), http://santiagotimes.cl/tax-dispute-delays-chiles-pascualama-mine/(last visited May 19, 2014).
39
Jen Sotolongo, Last Chance for Opponents to Appeal Pascua Lama Project, THE
SANTIAGO TIMES (June 6, 2006), http://santiagotimes.cl/last-chance-for-opponents-toappeal-pascua-lama-project/ (last visited May 19, 2014).
40
Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3.
41
Id. at ¶ 2.
42
Id. at ¶13.
43
Id. at ¶ 2.
44
After approving the claims asserted in the admissibility report, the IACHR subsequently
held a hearing for this case in October 2011. Information related to the events following
this hearing was unavailable. Molly Hoffsommer, Case 12.741 Agricultural Community of
Diaguita de los Huascoaltinos, Chile, HUM. RTS. BRIEF (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://hrbrief.org/2011/11/case-12-741-agricultural-community-of-diaguita-de-loshuascoaltinos-chile/ (last visited May 19, 2014).
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1. Chile Violated the Diaguita’s Right to Consultation and
Participation
In its petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(Commission), the Diaguita community alleged that the government failed
to inform it of the Pascua Lama project and the results of the
environmental studies conducted on its land. 45 As a result, the community
was unable to participate in any community consultations when the project
was first proposed and when the exploration concession was granted to
Barrick Gold. Access to information, under the American Convention’s
Freedom of Thought and Expression, is a central element of the right to
prior consultation, and is essential for the protection of indigenous lands. 46
The Diaguita Huascoaltinos argued that by failing to provide the needed
information regarding the project, Chile violated its right to FPIC and
consultation under international human rights law. Regarding this issue,
the Commission concluded:
[O]ne of the central elements to the protection of indigenous
property rights is the requirement that States undertake
effective and fully informed consultations with indigenous
communities regarding acts or decisions that may affect their
traditional territories . . . [and that member States are
obliged] to ensure that any determination . . . is based upon
a process of fully informed consent on the part of the
indigenous community as a whole. This requires, at a
minimum, that all of the members of the community are fully
and accurately informed of the nature and consequences of
the process and provided with an effective opportunity to
participate individually or as collectives.47
Here, the environmental agency that issued Barrick Gold the
approval for Pascua Lama did not take into consideration the effect that
45

Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶. 9.
Id. at ¶ 60.
47
Id. (citing Maya Indigenous Community of the Toledo District (Belize) Case 12.053,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 40/04, No. 142 (2004).
46
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the extraction project would have on the indigenous community. 48 The
Diaguita were particularly susceptible to irreparable harm at the hands of
Barrick Gold and the Pascua Lama mine, considering the impact the
project would have on the social, cultural, and economic aspects of the
indigenous way of life. 49 By failing to consider these potential risks and
denying the Diaguita the right to access information and participation,
Chile threatened the entire community’s survival.
2. COREMA’s Approval of Barrick Gold’s EIA Violated the
Diaguita’s Right to Property and Natural Resources
The Diaguita Huascoaltinos argued that the approval of the Pascua
Lama mine deprived them of their land and the natural resources found on
it.50 They alleged that although the government had knowledge of the
alleged fraudulent transfer of Diaguita Huascoaltino land and the pending
civil suit regarding the matter, it granted Barrick Gold’s 2000 EIA and the
subsequent 2006 modification. 51 In addition, the approval of the project
without the consideration of the potential cultural and environmental
impacts on the indigenous community was also a violation of their right to
property.52 Studies conducted during the approval process discovered
that, since Barrick Gold was granted its exploration concession, the size of
the Toro I, Toro II, and Esperanza glaciers had experienced fifty to
seventy percent reduction in size. 53 The project also threatens the

48

Id. at ¶ 61-2.
See Id. at ¶ 62.
50
Id. at ¶14.
51
Id. at ¶ 57; see also Reclamo Huascoaltinos es Admitido por la Comisión
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, OBSERVSATORIO LATINOAMERICANO DE
CONFLICTOS AMBIENTALES (Feb. 21, 2010),
http://www.olca.cl/oca/chile/region03/pascualama448.htm (last visited May 19, 2014).
52
Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 14.
53
Camila Quieroz, Greenpeace Revela que Actividades de la Minera Barrick Gold
Afectaron los Glaciares, ADITAL (July 20, 2011),
http://site.adital.com.br/site/noticia.php?boletim=1&lang=ES&cod=58565 (last visited Apr.
6, 2014); see also Thomás Rothe, Government Study Confirms Chile Glaciers Receding
Quickly, THE SANTIAGO TIMES (Jan. 21, 2009), http://santiagotimes.cl/govt-study-confirmschile-glaciers-receding-quickly/ (last visited May 19, 2014).
49
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community’s access to natural resources, specifically, its water supply,
and compromises its survival.54
The Diaguita have a distinct and deeply-rooted connection with
their ancestral lands. This connection is born from a spiritual and cultural
place, as these lands have been the site where sacred rituals and worship
ceremonies took place. 55 This indigenous community, in particular, has
lived on this same land without interruption since colonial times, passing
the land, and the cultural bond to it, from generation to generation. 56 The
international community has acknowledged and respected this bond in its
treaties and declarations as well as its judicial decisions. 57 The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has declared that “for indigenous
communities, relations to the land are not merely a matter of possession
and production but a material and spiritual element which they must fully
enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to future
generations.”58
In addition, the natural resources on, and around, the lands play an
integral role in the special relationship between the Diaguita and their
territory. The community’s ways of life is often centered on natural
resources within their land, and are approached in a highly respectful and
spiritual manner. 59 Thus, when development and extraction projects
interfere with traditional indigenous lands—as is the case here—the

54

Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 14.
See Jo M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations
Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, 27 W IS. INT'L L.J. 51, 56 (2009).
56
VALLEY OF THE NATIVES, supra note 14, at 99.
57
See infra Part II.A.
58
INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ RIGHTS OVER THEIR LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES:
NORMS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, ¶ 56, OEA/
Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 56/09 (Dec. 30, 2009) (citing Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni
Cmty v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter.-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 79, ¶
149, (Jan. 31, 2001)) [hereinafter NORMS AND JURISPRUDENCE].
59
Raimundo Pérez Larrain, El Caso Pascua Lama: los Huascoaltinos y el Derecho
Humano al Agua, in GLOBALIZACIÓN, supra note 27, at 420-1.
55
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community’s entire system of life is compromised, and the cultural and
territorial integrity of the indigenous people is threatened. 60
3. Construction of Pascua Lama Deprived the Diaguita of
the Ability to Make a Living and Interfered with Their
Customs and Traditions
Upon receiving approval for the Pascua Lama mining project,
Barrick Gold blocked access to public roads traditionally used by the
Diaguita Huascoaltinos. 61 These roads lead to Barrick Gold’s construction
site, but they also lead to the mountainside pastures where the goats and
mules graze, as well as to the river on which the community relies as a
source of water.62 In addition to interfering with the free movement of
vehicles, people, and animals along this public road, the location of the
mine itself interferes with the community’s ability to earn a livelihood in its
customary and traditional way.63
The construction of the mine has compromised the quality of the
water, and depleted the natural resources deemed essential to the
community’s ability to make a living.64 The Diaguita depend on the water
not only to sustain themselves and their animals, but also to grow the
grapes, avocados, peaches and other crops they eat and sell.65 Protection
of these natural resources is necessary to ensure the physical and cultural
survival of the community. 66 Under international law, Chile was obligated
to seek the Diaguita Huascoaltinos’ consent and consultation, and provide
for effective participation before exercising any control over the natural
resources that play a fundamental role in their survival.67

60

Diaguita Agric. Cmty’s of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 14.
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See Id. at ¶14.
65
Marianela Jarroud, Chilean Court Suspends Pascua Lama Mine, INTER PRESS SERV.
NEWS AGENCY (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/04/chilean-court-suspendspascua-lama-mine/ (last visited May 19, 2014).
66
NORMS AND JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 58, at ¶183.
67
Id. at ¶ 187.
61
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Nature of the Diaguita Huascoaltinos’ Claims Against
Barrick Gold

Following the finding of admissibility by the Commission, the
Diaguita Huascoaltinos filed a claim against Barrick Gold in Chile’s
domestic courts, alleging that the mining company failed to comply with
the conditions of the environmental impact study resulting in a threat to
their water source. 68 In April 2013, Chile’s Copiapo Court of Appeals
ordered an injunction, suspending all work on the project while it made its
determinations in the case. 69
The Pascua Lama project had received its environmental approval
conditioned on the construction of a proper drainage system to prevent
any damage to the water supply and the Toro I, Toro II, and Esperanza
glaciers.70 The Diaguita asserted that in addition to not constructing the
drainage system, Barrick Gold contaminated the indigenous community’s
water source with “heavy concentrations of arsenic, aluminum, copper,
and sulfate.”71 The General Water Department also presented studies
confirming the significant deterioration of the nearby glaciers.72 That July,
the court upheld the suspension, citing twenty-three environmental
violations,73 and effectively shutting down the project until Barrick Gold put
the proper water canals and drainage systems in place. 74
Simultaneously,
Chile’s
newly
created
Environmental
Superintendent (SMA) completed a thorough investigation of Barrick Gold
and its alleged environmental violations in the construction of the Pascua

68

Jarroud, supra note 65.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Sarah Tory, Indigenous Groups to Appeal Chilean Court’s Ruling on Pascua-Lama,
THE SANTIAGO TIMES (July 20, 2013), http://santiagotimes.cl/indigenous-groups-to-appealchilean-courts-ruling-on-pascua-lama/ (last visited May 19, 2014).
74
Sarah Tory, Chilean Court Rules in Favor of Suspension of Pascua-Lama Mine, THE
SANTIAGO TIMES (July 15, 2013), http://santiagotimes.cl/chilean-court-rules-in-favor-ofsuspension-of-pascua-lama/ (last visited May 19, 2014).
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Lama mine.75
Finding serious violations, SMA also suspended
construction on the Pascua Lama project, and imposed the highest fine
permitted by law, $16 million.76 Although the fine was a promising step in
the right direction, the indigenous community and environmental activists
agreed that the fine was only a small percentage of the project’s total
budget and insignificant to a mining giant like Barrick Gold. 77
In response to SMA’s sanction and the Court of Appeals’
suspension, the Diaguita Huascoaltinos appealed to the Supreme Court of
Chile.78 Similar to the Diaguita’s prayer for relief in their case against
Goldcorp,79 the Diaguita asked the court to revoke Barrick Gold’s
environmental permit and order the company to submit a new EIA. 80 The
court, finding the suspension and the penalties imposed by SMA sufficient,
declined to suspend the permit, allowing Barrick Gold to resume
construction once they put the appropriate water management systems in
place.81
II.

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE
SHORTCOMINGS OF CHILE’S DOMESTIC LAW

Various legal frameworks, both international and domestic in
nature, govern indigenous environmental and human rights. These rights
are inherently linked to the indigenous community’s ownership and use of
traditional lands. With the increase of mineral extraction projects carried
75

Chile Fines Barrick Gold $16m for Pascua-Lama Mine, BBC NEWS (May 24, 2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22663432 (last visited May 19, 2014).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Eric Lopez, In Relief for Barrick, Chile Court Doesn't Nix Mine Permit, REUTERS (Sept.
25, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/25/chile-pascua-lama-suspensionidUSL2N0HL2E720130925 (last visited May 19, 2014).
79
The Diaguita Huascoaltinos brought a claim against Goldcorp for violating their right to
FPIC when Goldcorp began constructing El Morro mine without consulting with the
indigenous community. Jade Hobman, Chilean Supreme Court Suspends Approval for
Mining Project, THE SANTIAGO TIMES (May 1, 2012), http://santiagotimes.cl/chileansupreme-court-suspends-approval-for-mining-project/ (last visited May 19, 2014); infra
Part III.B.
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Lopez, supra note 78.
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out by transnational companies and Latin American states, these rights
are frequently being challenged. 82 Where international law recognizes
and seeks to protect certain rights, domestic law often falls short of
implementing and enforcing those protections. 83
A.

International Protections for the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples

The existing international legal frameworks recognize the
indigenous right to property, 84 consultations,85 and FPIC;86 and protection
of the environment and natural resources;87 as well as subsistence and
economic activities.88 Flowing from the inter-connectedness of the
indigenous community and its traditional lands, 89 these rights are
classified into three distinct, yet often overlapping categories of protection:
(1) an environmental dimension, which acknowledges the crucial function
of the natural resources in the advancement of an indigenous community’s
cultural, social and economic rights; (2) a cultural dimension, which
embraces the principle that the land is closely tied with the community’s
traditional livelihood, customs, and way of life; and (3) an economic

82

Lillian Aponte Miranda, Uploading the Local: Assessing the Contemporary Relationship
Between Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure Systems and International Human Rights
Law Regarding the Allocation of Traditional Lands and Resources in Latin America, 10
OR. REV. INT'L L. 419, 420 (2008).
83
See Alexandra R. Harrington, Don’t Mind the Gap: The Rise of Individual Complaint
Mechanisms Within International Human Rights Treaties, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 153
(2012).
84
Int’l Labour Org., Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, art. 16, June 27, 1989, 72 ILO Official Bulletin, 1650 U.N.T.S.
383 [hereinafter ILO Convention 169].
85
Id. at art. 16.
86
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art 19, art. 32(2),
G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, Oct. 2, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
87
Id. at art. 4, 7, 15.
88
Id. at art. 20.
89
Siegfried Weissner, Re-Enchanting the World: Indigenous Peoples’ Rights as Essential
Parts of a Holistic Human Rights Regime, 15 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 239, 254
(2010) [hereinafter Weissner, Re-Enchanting the World].
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dimension, which recognizes the essential role that traditional lands play
in the community’s livelihood.90
1. ILO Convention 107 and ILO Convention 169
The ILO was the first body of law to seriously address the issue of
indigenous peoples and their rights.91 ILO Convention 107, adopted in
1957, promoted the international community’s commitment to protect the
rights of indigenous peoples with an emphasis on the progressive
assimilation of the indigenous community into their respective countries. 92
As the international community shifted from an assimilative basis
for protection to recognition of the right to self-determination93 and the
cultural diversity within the indigenous community, ILO Convention 107
was no longer consistent with this viewpoint.94 In 1989, ILO Convention
169 was adopted95 and, as of 2013, ratified by twenty-two countries.96
Chile became a party to Convention 169 on September 15, 2008, and the

90

Diaguita Agric. Cos of the Huascoaltinos, supra note 3, at ¶ 2; IMPLICATIONS OF PASCUA
LAMA, supra note 21, at 6.
91
Alessandro Fodella, International Law and the Diversity of Indigenous Peoples, 30 VT.
L. REV. 565, 566 (2006).
92
Weissner, Re-Enchanting the World, supra note 89, at 248.
93
In this context, the term “self-determination” refers to indigenous peoples’ general right
to determine their own political status and economic and cultural development and not
the extreme interpretation of the term, which implies the right to secession. Fodella, supra
note 91, at 578; Tara Ward, The Right to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous
Peoples' Participation Rights within International Law,10 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 54, 55
(2011), available at
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1125&context
=njihr (last visited May 19, 2014).
94
Fodella, supra note 91, at 585.
95
INT’L LABOUR ORG., C169 – INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES CONVENTION, 1989 (NO.
169),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_COD
E:C169 (last visited May 19, 2014).
96
INT’L LABOUR ORG., RATIFICATIONS OF C169 – INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES
CONVENTION, 1989 (NO. 169),
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT
_ID:312314, (last visited May 14, 2014).
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treaty entered into force in September 2009.97 This new legal framework
codifies the principle of FPIC and consultations, and establishes a
procedure for the exploitation of mineral resources on indigenous lands. 98
Article 6 introduces the right to FPIC and participation, requiring
states to “consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures
and in particular through their representative institutions, whenever
consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures
which may affect them directly.”99 It also creates avenues through which
indigenous peoples may freely participate at all levels of decision-making
in policies or projects that concern them. 100
The process of consultation must include certain elements to
comply with ILO Convention 169. First, the consultations should occur
before the decision affecting the indigenous community is made. The
purpose of FPIC is to reach an agreement or obtain the indigenous
community’s consent. 101 To fulfill this objective, the consultation must
occur before any decision is made. In addition, the parties must carry out
the consultation in good faith. This good faith provision implies that the
consultation should occur voluntarily and the indigenous peoples should
have access to all the information needed to fully participate in the
consultation.102 Another critical component to the effectiveness of the
FPIC process is the need for the consultation to occur through appropriate
procedures. Although ILO Convention 169 does not explicitly create a
standard that it considers appropriate, it does make reference to the need
97

INT’L LABOUR ORG., RATIFICATIONS FOR CHILE,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:
102588 (last visited May 19, 2014).
98
Fodella, supra note 91, at 587.
99
ILO Convention 169, supra note 84, at art. 6(1)(a).
100
Id. at art. 6(1)(b).
101
Jorge Contessee Singh, El Derecho de Consulta Previa en el Convenio 169 de la OIT:
Notas para su Implementacion en Chile, in EL CONVENIO 169 DE LA OIT Y EL DERECHO
CHILENO: MECANISMOS Y OBSTÁCULOS PARA SU IMPLEMENTACIÓN 189, 194 (2012), available
at http://www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/udp_convenio_digital.pdf (last visited May 19, 2014) [hereinafter
El Derecho].
102
Id. at 196.
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to ensure the indigenous communities understand the proceedings. 103
This allows each indigenous community taking part in the FPIC to employ
its own unique form of communication based on its traditions and
customs.104
Through this process, FPIC is able to serve as the foundation for
other indigenous rights, such as the right to a clean environment and right
to property. The rights to a clean and healthy environment, and the right
to environmental protection, are emerging rights in the international
human rights arena.105 ILO Convention 169 addresses and codifies these
environmental rights in the context of indigenous and tribal peoples. 106
Article 4 creates a duty for the ratifying state to adopt special measures to
safeguard the environment of the people concerned, and requires that
these measures be consistent with the wishes of the indigenous
peoples.107 The state must also consider the environmental impact any
proposed development project will have on the indigenous community
through public participation of that community. 108 The results of these
assessments are considered fundamental to the implementation of the
development project. 109 Article 7 concludes by requiring the state to
protect and preserve the environment inhabited by the indigenous
communities.110
Articles 13 and 15 of ILO Convention 169 describe different aspects
of the indigenous community’s right to property. 111 ILO Convention 169
opens this section of the treaty by acknowledging the importance of land
to indigenous peoples, and interprets the term “land” to mean the total

103
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371-2 (2002).
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environment of indigenous territory.112
This provision extends the
protections not only to the property the indigenous peoples occupy, but
also to the nearby land whose use is a necessary component to their
traditional way of life.113
Recognizing the critical link between the land, its natural resources,
and the indigenous communities, ILO Convention 169 offers special
safeguards to the indigenous peoples’ right to participate in the use,
management, and conservation of the natural resources on the land they
inhabit.114 Furthermore, Article 15 speaks to states, like Chile, where the
government owns the minerals. In these instances, the state must consult
with the affected peoples and determine how the implementation of a
development project may infringe on their rights.115 These consultations
must occur before exploration or exploitation rights to the concerned land
are transferred.116
2. American Convention on Human Rights
The Organization of American States (OAS) is made up of thirtyfive independent states that came together in 1967 for the purpose of
promoting solidarity and cooperation amongst the states. 117 The member
states of OAS approved the incorporation of the American Convention on
Human Rights into The Charter in 1967.118 This international instrument
recognized that man’s fundamental rights arose from his status as a
112

Id. at art. 13.
Dominique Herv & Sergio P rez, Adecuación de la Legislación a los Estánderes
Impuestos para la Administración de Recursos Naturales, in EL CONVENIO 169 DE LA OIT
Y EL DERECHO CHILENO: MECANISMOS Y OBSTÁCULOS PARA SU IMPLEMENTACIÓN 15, 59
(2012), available at
http://www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/udp_convenio_digital.p
df (last visited May 19, 2014) [hereinafter Recursos Naturales].
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ILO Convention 169, supra note 84, at art. 15.
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Organization of American States (OAS), Charter of the Organization of the American
States, art.1, Feb. 30, 1948, O.A.T.S. No. 41, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
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Organization of American States (OAS), American Convention on Human Rights,
preamble, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. [hereinafter American
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human being, not his citizenship within a country. 119 The American
Convention recognized principles set out in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights; for instance, that freedom can only be fully enjoyed if the
conditions are established where man can pursue his economic, cultural,
and social rights free from fear of persecution. 120
The American Convention outlines both the right to participate in
government,121 as well as the freedom of thought and expression, under
Article 13.122 These articles provide two essential elements to the
informed consultation process. Article 13 facilitates the consultation
process by recognizing the freedom to “seek, receive, and impart”
information; and ensuring indigenous peoples have the information
necessary to be fully informed.123 In addition, the right to participate in
government recognizes “the right of every citizen to take part in conduct of
public affairs,”124 ensuring that the indigenous community has the
opportunity to “participate in decision-making on matters and policies that
affect or could affect their rights.” 125 For the indigenous community, both
the right to participate and the freedom to access information are
fundamental elements of the right to consultation, and are linked to other
human rights, including the indigenous peoples’ right to property. 126
This right to property is laid out in Article 21 of the American
Convention, which recognizes the right to the use and enjoyment of
private and communal property.127 In the context of indigenous peoples,
the right to property is often considered in conjunction with Article 25’s
right to judicial protection when it is alleged that the community’s right to
use and enjoy their property has in some way been infringed and the state
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has failed to provide prompt recourse.128 Two examples of this are Awas
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua and Saramaka v. Suriname; in both
cases, the state granted concessions to natural resources found within
indigenous territory, and then failed to respond to the community’s claims
in regards to those concessions.129
In Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, the indigenous community
petitioned the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to stop Nicaragua
from granting a logging concession on traditionally communal lands. 130
Nicaragua argued that the lands claimed by the community belonged to
the state, and that the community did not have a real property title deed to
the land.131 The court stated that in this context, the term “property” had a
distinct meaning from the meaning it had in domestic law. 132 At the
international level the term encompassed those items that were movable
and immovable, tangible and intangible. 133 The court also described
human rights treaties as “live instruments whose interpretation must adapt
to the evolution of the times, and specifically, to current living
conditions.”134 The court concluded that the Awas Tingni community had
possessed the land in question, and based their ownership of it as a
community, not as individuals. 135 The court held that, under Article 21 of
the American Convention, the indigenous peoples had a communal
property right to the land, and by granting logging concessions without the
community’s consent, the state had interfered with the community’s
fundamental basis of culture, integrity, and economic survival. 136
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Similarly, in the landmark case of Saramaka v. Suriname, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights found that indigenous communities have
the right to own the natural resources they have traditionally used within
their lands just as they have the right to own the land they have
traditionally occupied. 137 The court declared that protection of these
natural resources was essential to ensure the physical and cultural
survival of the community. 138 The court also identified safeguards that the
state was obligated to enforce for the protection of indigenous rights to
land and natural resources, starting with the effective participation of the
Saramaka people “in conformity with their customs and traditions.”139
These safeguards would be implicated in all government acts “regarding
any development, investment, exploration, or extraction plan within
Saramaka territory.”140 In addition, the state was required to comply with
its obligation to ensure that it did not issue any concessions within
indigenous territory until an independent environmental and social impact
study was completed and approved. 141
3. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
People
Concerned with the increasingly prevalent discriminatory practices
towards minority populations, a United Nations Economic and Social
Council established a Working Group on Indigenous Populations in
1982.142 The group was charged with reviewing developments related to
the human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples and
developing an international standard concerning these rights. 143 With the
participation of indigenous representatives and national governments, the
group began drafting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in 1985, submitting the complete draft for
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consideration in 1993.144 Twenty years, and several consultations and
revisions later, the final version of UNDRIP was adopted in 2007. As of
December 2010, it has reached a global consensus.145 Chile was among
the 144 countries to adopt UNDRIP on September 13, 2007. 146
Although not legally binding on its signatories, UNDRIP carries with
it the expectation that member states will comply with its subject matter, 147
and may in time rise to the level of customary law. This international
instrument outlines the rights of the indigenous peoples recognized and
protected by the international community, building on earlier frameworks,
such as ILO Convention 169.148 UNDRIP affirms that indigenous peoples
are equal to all people, and at the same time recognizes their right to be
different.149 It was developed, in part, out of concern for the manner in
which indigenous lands had historically been taken, preventing the
communities from development in accordance with their customs and
traditions.150
The legal protections extended to indigenous lands are derived
from the deeply intertwined relationship between the communal lands and
the peoples’ spirituality and traditional way of life.151 Article 26 describes
the indigenous community’s right to use and control the lands they have
traditionally owned or occupied and the state’s obligation to grant legal
protection and recognition to the lands.152 The community also has the
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right to the conservation and protection of the environment and the use of
their land and natural resources under Article 29.153
UNDRIP also takes the principle of consultation set forth in ILO
Convention 169, and reintroduces it as an obligation to obtain consent. 154
Where ILO Convention 169 only requires the indigenous community to
give consent in decisions that will result in its displacement, 155 UNDRIP
requires that FPIC be obtained in all decisions that affect them. 156 In
addition, Article 10 requires FPIC be obtained where the indigenous
community will be relocated and prohibits the state from forcibly removing
them from their land. 157 The state is also responsible for facilitating the
participation of the community in decisions concerning their rights in a
manner consistent with their customs. 158
Article 3 of the declaration recognizes an indigenous community’s
right to self-determination and its ability to freely pursue economic, social,
and cultural development,159 while not being subject to forced assimilation
and the destruction of its culture.160 Article 20 further safeguards the
development and survival of the indigenous communities by protecting
enjoyment of their unique means of providing food for themselves and
making a living.161
These international instruments as a whole identify and establish
the rights and protections guaranteed to indigenous and tribal peoples;
however, there exists a gap between the creation of the obligation on an
international level and the implementation and enforcement of the treaty
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Id. at art. 10
158
Id. at art. 18.
159
Id. at art. 3.
160
Id. at art. 8.
161
Id. at art. 20.
154

664

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014

domestically.162 International treaties rely on the political will of domestic
governments to adequately implement and enforce its obligations. 163 The
resulting implementation gap has allowed member states to comply with
international commitments on paper, while in reality not completely
adhering to the requirements of the treaty. 164
B.

Chile’s Domestic Laws Fail to Satisfy its International
Obligations under ILO Convention 169

A party to an international treaty must adjust its law to ensure
consistency with the treaty. 165 Upon signing ILO Convention 169, Chile
became obligated to implement its provisions within its domestic law.
Chile responded by implementing Executive Decree 124; however, this
law severely limited the FPIC process and was inconsistent with ILO
Convention 169.166 In addition, Chile was required to modify its laws
regulating the environment, the mining industry, and other areas that have
an impact on indigenous peoples, but again Chile’s modifications came up
short.167
1. Indigenous Law No. 19.253 and Executive Decree 124
Enacted in 1993, the Indigenous Law recognizes and protects
various aspects of Chile’s indigenous communities, including its customs,
education, and development. 168 In particular, Articles 12 and 13 describe
protections to indigenous lands; however, the emphasis is on identification
162
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See Decreto 124, Septiembre 4, 2009, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile), available at
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1006486&buscar=decreto+124 (last visited May
15, 2015) [hereinafter Decree 124].
167
MECANISMOS Y OBSTÁCULOS PARA SU IMPLEMENTACIÓN 15, 57 (2012),
http://www.derechoshumanos.udp.cl/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/udp_convenio_digital.p
df (last visited Apr. 6, 2014).
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and transfer of indigenous territory.169 The Indigenous Law fails to grant
any protection to the indigenous community’s right to use and occupy the
land.170 It is also more restrictive in its interpretation of indigenous
territory, in comparison to ILO Convention 169. 171 Here, the limited
protections offered do not extend to the natural resources used by
indigenous peoples, only to the actual land they occupy within the
boundaries of their territory.172
Chile ratified ILO Convention 169 on September 15, 2008. 173 Soon
after the treaty entered into force one year later, then-President Michelle
Bachelet enacted Decree 124, severely limiting FPIC in Chile. 174 The
purpose of the decree was to regulate the manner in which consultations
and indigenous participation occurred.175 Nevertheless, the language of
the decree is inconsistent with ILO Convention 169, only extending
indigenous peoples the right to express their opinion regarding new
government actions that directly affect them, excluding actions of
investment and extraction companies, in accordance with the procedure
established by the decree. 176 Instead, these companies are subject to the
consultation and participation procedures established by the relevant
government agencies through, for example, the environmental or mining
laws.177 However, Chile’s Mining Code, discussed below, makes no
provision for consultation with indigenous peoples.178
Decree 124 limits the obligation to obtain FPIC by only requiring
that certain sectors of the government complete the consultation
169
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process.179 In addition, municipalities, which tend to have the most
contact and impact on indigenous peoples, are not required to participate
in the FPIC process.180
Decree 124 makes FPIC optional for
municipalities so they may engage in the consultation process, if it deems
it necessary.181 Adding to the list of limitations, Decree 124 imposes a
time limit on the consultation process.182 The municipality will only accept
community observations up to thirty days from the date the indigenous
community received the last notice regarding the project that triggered the
FPIC process.183 In contrast, ILO Convention 169 provides for the right to
consultation, participation, and FPIC at every stage of development, of
any matter that affects their rights, and in a manner consistent with the
indigenous peoples’ procedure.184 Despite efforts to repeal Decree 124
and adopt new consultation laws, 185 it continues to be in force.
2. Chile’s Environmental Framework
Ley de Bases del Medio Ambiente, or Ley 19,300, enacted in 1994
and amended in 2010, 186 is the principal framework for regulating the
country’s environmental protection. 187 Before the 2010 amendment, the
statute was responsible for reestablishing the role of Chile’s national
environmental authority (CORAMA) and the regional counterpart
(COREMA), identifying a formal system of review for EIA studies, and
establishing liability for environmental damage.188
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Article 1 of the Chile’s Environmental Framework Law, Law No.
19.300, establishes the “right to live in an environment free of pollution,” 189
a principle shared by the Chilean Constitution of 1980. 190
Article 10
identifies mining development projects as an activity that is likely to cause
environmental damage, while Article 11 requires that an EIA be completed
before the projects that “have significant adverse affects on the quality or
quantity of renewable natural resources, including land, water, and air” are
executed or modified. 191 Once submitted, COREMA, 192 along with the
National Mining and Geology Service (SERNAGEOMIN), and any other
relevant public agency, will evaluate the EIA study and return it to the
project owner with its observations and concerns. 193 The project owner is
then responsible for responding to those concerns and complying with any
requirements made by the agencies. Upon full completion of the
observations and requirements, COREMA issues an Environmental
Approval Resolution (EAR), granting the project permission to move
forward under Article 16.194
These laws also provide for specific public participation procedures
to take place during the evaluation of the EIA. 195 Article 27 requires the
project owner to publish an excerpt of the EIA in the Official Gazette,
where laws and decrees are published, as well as in local and national
newspapers.196 COREMA must also send the excerpt to the communities
that will be impacted by the proposed work, 197 and the community then
189
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has sixty days to submit any concerns to the commission. 198 COREMA
takes into consideration the citizens’ concerns at the conclusion of the
approval procedure, 199 but this protocol serves more as a way to inform
the public because citizen concerns are not binding on the agency. 200
This environmental framework is not intended to protect the rights of
indigenous peoples, as it only extends the opportunity for participation
without making any commitment to act on the observations. 201
Furthermore, the public participation procedures are not accommodating
to the usual and customary methods of communication used by
indigenous communities.202 The lack of specific procedures allows the
agency and project owners to carry out the public participation component
with an unacceptable degree of discretion and reduces the effectiveness
of the provision. 203
One reason Chile’s environmental framework has not been fully
implemented is due to a conflict between the country’s economic interests
in the mining industry and the legal obligations under these laws. 204 The
Catchments Management and Mining Impacts in Arid and Semi-Arid
South America Project released the results of an environmental study in
Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, identifying four reasons why Ley 19,300 has not
been fully implemented:
(1) economic criteria are often weighed more heavily than
technical or environmental concerns; (2) stakeholder and
public participation in the process is hindered by insufficient
198
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administrative support and assistance and the environmental
impact assessment time frame “is not long enough for
people to understand the depth of the implications for each
project;” (3) control of the projects is technically under
jurisdiction of local administrative services, but these
services generally do not have sufficient resources to
adequately process proposed projects; and (4) Law No.
19,300 allows projects to start before approval. 205
Other criticisms of this environmental law include the inadequacy of
the EIA; the lack of proper policies and regulations; the lack of
enforcement and sanctions; and the agency’s tendency to make political
decisions as opposed to technical ones.206 Critics also disapprove of the
framework’s reliance on political will for enforcement and the inadequate
protection of natural resources. 207
3. Chile’s Mining Laws: Mining Code, Mining Concession
Law, and Bilateral Mining Treaty
Today, mining is the largest and most lucrative industry for Chile,
and brings in the most foreign investment to this Latin American
country.208 Prior to the enactment of Chile’s Mining Code and Mining
Concession Law in 1983, the government owned and operated all of the
country’s mines and mineral deposits.209 The mining laws brought
privatization of all new mines and mineral deposits, and an influx of
transnational mineral extraction companies. 210 Article I of the Mining Code
provides that Chile has exclusive and inalienable rights to all mines and
205
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subsurface mineral deposits.211 The state is, however, able to grant
concessions under Article 2, which confers property title to the holder of
the concession.212 This title applies only to subsurface minerals and
mines, and is distinct from the title to the surface land on which the mining
project is taking place. 213
The Constitutional Mining Concession Law supplements the Mining
Code, describing the basic doctrine laid out in the Mining Code and also
outlining the rights of concession holders.214 The Concession Law grants
the concessionaire the exclusive right to prospect and excavate, while the
Mining Code limits the right to “prevent damages to the owner of the land
or to protect public interest purposes.”215 This limited reference to the
rights of the surface property owner is indicative of Chile’s typical
approach of undermining the rights of its indigenous peoples in favor of
the mining industry.
While the Mining Code and the Mining Concession Law detail the
rights of the government and of concession holder, they do little to identify
the rights of indigenous landowners. Specifically, there is no express
reference to the consultation process that should be undertaken when
subsurface minerals are located on indigenous territory, in violation of
Article 15 of ILO 169. 216

211

CÓDIGO DE MINERIA (MINING CODE) [COD. MIN.] art. 1 (Chile), available at
http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=29668 (last visited May 19, 2014).
212
Id. at art. 2.
213
Free Market Environmentalism, supra note 204, at 268.
214
Id.
215
Id. at 269; Law No. 18.097, art. 7, Enero 7, 1982, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile),
available at http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=29522&buscar=LEY+18.097 (last
visited May 19, 2014).
216
Gonzalo Aguilar Cavallo, Pascua Lama, Human Rights, and Indigenous Peoples: A
Chilean Case Through the Lens of International Law, GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L., 215, 245
(2013), available at http://www.gojil.eu/issues/51/51_article_cavallo.pdf. (last visited May
19, 2014).

671

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014

MODIFYING CHILE’S LAW TO REFLECT THE PROTECTIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW

III.

Although moving towards increased protection of indigenous
peoples’ rights, existing domestic law has failed to adequately implement
and enforce international protections. While having the potential to
guarantee that rights to land and natural resources are not infringed, ILO
169 and FPIC have fallen short of that goal in Chile. 217 This article
proposes that Chile implement a domestic legal framework similar to
Venezuela and Peru.
These countries have each been able to
successfully implement FPIC into their respective constitutions and
enforce it adequately.
Chile and its indigenous populations would also benefit from
establishing private sector compliance incentives. ILO Convention 169
and UNDRIP do not impose legal obligations on the extraction companies
themselves; however, the Chilean government must still satisfy its
commitments to the indigenous peoples regardless of the transnational
company’s involvement in the project.218 Failure to consult indigenous
peoples and obtain FPIC in the Pascua Lama mining project has led to
highly publicized litigation and extensive financial consequences for
Barrick Gold.219 This negative result to what was to be the world’s largest
open pit mine may drive mining companies to seek locations outside of
Chile for future mining projects. Chile would benefit from encouraging
transnational companies to respect FPIC obligations at the inception of the
project, and thereby reduce the likelihood that this series of events will
repeat itself.
A.

Implementation of Domestic Laws Recognizing the
Obligation to Obtain FPIC

To fulfill its obligations under ILO Convention 169, Chile must
repeal Decree 124. Rather than enact a new executive decree, the right
217
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to FPIC should be a part of the national constitution, and Congress should
create a law establishing the procedures that model Venezuela’s and
Peru’s approaches.220 Executive decrees tend to be inconsistent and
depend on the will of the executive office. 221 In contrast, constitutional
recognition of the FPIC process would provide “a greater stability over
time, as well as security” as opposed to an executive decree. 222
1. Venezuela’s Constitutionalization of ILO Convention No.
169 and Comprehensive Bill of Indigenous Rights
Venezuela’s 1999 National Constitution codifies the social, cultural,
and economic rights of the country’s indigenous peoples. 223 It recognizes
their customs, their language, and the “original rights to the lands they
ancestrally and traditionally occupy.”224 Under this new constitution,
indigenous property rights are non-transferable, inalienable, and
collective, protecting traditional lands from the common threat of
seizure.225 Article 120 addresses the exploitation of natural resources
located on Native lands and requires that the state engage the indigenous
peoples in informed consultations prior to the implementation of any
exploitation project, implementing domestically the country’s international
obligations.226 Article 125 recognizes the right to participate in the
government and provides for indigenous representation in the
legislature.227
This constitutional recognition of indigenous rights—specifically
FPIC—has been implemented in several Latin American countries,
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including Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia.228
By incorporating the
indigenous right to FPIC into the national constitution, Chile would extend
to the indigenous community special protections already in place in its
neighboring Latin American countries.229
Constitutionalizing the
international indigenous right to FPIC will ensure the enforcement of these
rights and improve the political status of the indigenous community, as has
been the case in Venezuela.230
Venezuela has also adopted a comprehensive bill of indigenous
rights within the constitution, in addition to the constitutional recognition of
indigenous rights.
The Organic Law for Indigenous Peoples and
Communities (LOPCI), adopted in 2005, outlines in language similar to
ILO Convention 169, the procedure for FPIC.231 Article 54 requires
informed and freely expressed consultation when natural resources found
on Native lands will be exploited. 232 Article 55 extends this obligation to all
projects, whether public or private, and whether located entirely on Native
lands, or on only a portion of Native lands.233 In addition to the right to
consultation, indigenous peoples also have the right to object to proposed
projects when they affect their cultural or environmental integrity. 234
Venezuela also goes further than Chile’s Decree 124 by offering technical
and legal assistance to indigenous peoples to ensure that they are fully
informed and have access to the FPIC process. 235
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2. Peru’s Cooperative Effort and Database of Indigenous
Peoples
Although Peru ratified ILO Convention 169 in 1994, 236 Peru’s
legislature did not enact domestic laws regulating the FPIC process until
September 2011. 237 During the seventeen years before the enactment,
Peru was the most problematic state in the Inter-American System with
regard to indigenous rights, having been issued the most adverse
judgments by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and having the
most individual petitions filed against it.238 Peru’s Law on the Right to
Prior Consultation of the Indigenous or Native Peoples (Law Decree No.
29785) serves not only to identify the policies and procedures of FPIC in
Peru, but as a way to prevent the violent protests the country had been
experiencing in relation to the violation of internationally recognized
indigenous rights.239
Article 1 requires that Law Decree No. 29785 be interpreted in
conformity with ILO 169’s obligations. The law goes on to describe the
process and purpose of the consultations. Unlike Chile’s Decree 124, the
Peruvian framework uses language very similar to that used in ILO
Convention 169, closing the implementation gap between international
and domestic law.240
In addition, the law calls for the collaboration of Congress and other
government agencies, such as the Ministry of Energy and Mining and the
Ministry of Transportation and Communication, to implement FPIC. 241
Through this cooperative effort, for example, Congress is charged with
236

Ratifications for Peru, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11200:0::NO:11200:P11200_COUNTRY_ID:
102805 (last visited May 19, 2014).
237
Elizabeth Salmon, The Struggle for Law of Free, Prior, and Informed Consultation in
Peru: Lessons and Ambiguities in the Recognition of IP, 22 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 353,
379 (2013).
238
Id. at 367.
239
Id. at 379.
240
Christina Feterhoff, Column, Latin America: Peru Enacts Law of Prior Consultation
with Indigenous Peoples, 19 No. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 26, 27 (2011).
241
Salmon, supra note 237, at 382.

675

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW JOURNAL

Volume II, Issue II – Spring 2014

creating the laws, policies, and procedures that govern FPIC, the Ministry
of Energy and Mining is responsible for investigations into proposed
development and extraction projects, and the Ministry of Transportation
and Communication ensures the full participation of indigenous peoples in
the consultation process. 242
To further implement the FPIC process and facilitate information
sharing, Law Decree No. 29785 creates a database of indigenous
communities and their representatives, ensuring that project owners and
government agencies share information regarding projects that affect
indigenous rights in a timely manner.243 The database must identify the
indigenous community’s leader or representative, the community’s
geographical location, languages spoken within the community, as well as
any relevant cultural information. 244
Chile should adopt a law similar to Venezuela’s indigenous law and
Peru’s cooperative effort, as well as the indigenous database to more
effectively abide by its FPIC obligations. This law would create a system
of checks and balances where each relevant government agency is
responsible for a particular aspect of the FPIC process. Each agency
would then be held accountable to the other agencies, making it more
likely that the obligations will be respected. Accordingly, the indigenous
database will facilitate the consultation process and safeguard the rights of
the indigenous community by gathering and sharing all relevant
information before any decision affecting it is made.
B.

Private Sector Incentives to Encourage Compliance with
the FPIC Process

A unique element of Peru’s Law Decree No. 29785 is its
requirement for private sector compliance through the adoption of
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education measures. 245 All investment companies whose proposed
projects concern indigenous rights must engage in FPIC discussions at
the inception of the process under this law. 246 By educating the extraction
companies about the obligations and process of FPIC, Peru has ensured
the protection of indigenous interests.
Chile could implement a similar requirement, in which a prerequisite
for receiving a mining concession would be the participation in an FPIC
education session. During these FPIC forums, the private companies
would be informed of the obligation and procedure of FPIC, in addition to
the ramifications resulting from a failure to comply. A major concern for
private companies with FPIC is the risk that indigenous consultation will
result in extensive delays and cost the company millions of dollars; 247
however, failure to respect the FPIC procedures can and likely will be an
even costlier risk.
One example of the consequences of not respecting FPIC is that of
the El Morro mine. Goldcorp, a Canadian mining company, learned an
expensive lesson after also failing to obtain the consent of the Diaguita
Huascoaltino community during the construction of El Morro; a gold and
copper mine located in the Huasco Valley. 248
Goldcorp lost its
environmental permit in May 2012 when the Chilean Supreme Court
upheld suspension of the $3.9 million project and ordered it to seek the
consent of the Diaguita community. 249 The court found that SMA did not
adequately consult with the Diaguita community when its construction was
likely to compromise the community’s water supply, harm their herding
animals, and interfere with the rights to their traditional lands. 250 The
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suspension resulted in a year-long delay and a significant increase in the
mining company’s operating costs.251
Barrick Gold and the Pascua Lama mine is also a perfect
illustration of just how costly failure to comply with FPIC can be. After
Chile’s environmental regulator found that Barrick Gold had seriously
violated their environmental permit and then tried to conceal their
violations, it imposed a $16 million fine, the highest permitted by law. 252
When calculating the initial cost of the project, the cost of delays, the fines,
and the cost of the modifications ordered by the court, Pascua Lama has
cost Barrick Gold over $5 billion. 253 In fact, Barrick Gold recently made
the decision to call off all work on the Pascua Lama mine in order to sell
off shares and pay off some of its debt. 254
Aside from seeking legal recourse, indigenous peoples have the
ability to greatly hinder the plans of an extraction company. The
International Finance Corporation (IFC) released their Sustainability
Framework in August 2011, in which it presented the result of a year and
half’s worth of public consultations. 255 In it, the IFC described the various
routes an indigenous community can take to block a mining project it has
not consented to. Some of these measures are peaceful, including
protests and rallies, roadblocks, and permit appeals.256 However, at times
these challenges can turn violent and lead to instances of excessive use
of force by police or the company’s private security, thus, opening up the
company to liability for human rights violations.257
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Conversely, where private sector extraction and development
companies have complied with the FPIC process, public opinion of the
companies has improved, while difficulty in obtaining approval permits has
decreased.258 Chile and Argentina’s Bilateral Mining Treaty259 has paved
the way for more transnational and multinational corporations to propose
extraction and development projects in this region. 260 By implementing an
education condition into domestic law, these figures may deter private
companies from moving forward with their projects without complying with
FPIC.
CONCLUSION
The right to FPIC and consultation is fundamental to the protection
of key human rights in the indigenous community. 261 In particular, when
FPIC is not respected, an indigenous community’s right to property and
natural resources is severely threatened.262 The existing body of
international jurisprudence identifies and outlines the indigenous
community’s right to FPIC, consultation, participation, and property, in
addition to several others. These instruments recognize the uniquely
intertwined relationship between indigenous peoples and the land they
have traditionally occupied.263 Nevertheless, the domestic implementation
of these rights has fallen short of the intended goal. 264
In particular, Chile’s failure to implement and enforce adequate
FPIC laws threatens the cultural and physical survival of the country’s
indigenous peoples. 265 In a country like Chile, where the extraction
industry is such a vital economic activity, indigenous communities are at a
258
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greater risk of having their right to FPIC violated when the country weighs
its economic interests more heavily than indigenous and environmental
rights.266 In the case of the Pascua Lama mine, the Diaguita
Huascoaltinos were deprived of their right to FPIC at every stage of the
project. Barrick Gold made no attempt to consult with the Diaguita
Huascoaltinos, and after manipulating the EIA process, was granted a
mining concession that gave them free reign of Diaguita land. 267
This article submits a proposal that addresses this two-part problem
by enforcing the obligations on the state and encouraging the compliance
of the private sector. First, Chile should amend its constitution to include
their FPIC obligations and pass a comprehensive bill outlining the process
and procedure of FPIC obligations. This law should create a cooperative
system of checks and balances among the relevant government agencies
to ensure full compliance and an indigenous database that will facilitate
the dissemination of information. This type of domestic law would not only
close the implementation gap, but it would also ensure that enforcement
does not depend solely on Chile’s political will. Second, Chile should
create an educational prerequisite and require private extraction and
development companies to engage in FPIC forums before they are eligible
to obtain exploration concessions. During this process, the financial and
social risks of non-compliance with FPIC would be made known, while
also providing the company with the information and tools needed to
respect the FPIC obligation. By implementing these changes, Chile will be
able to protect the rights of its indigenous communities and reduce the
likelihood that what happened in the case of the Diaguita Huascoaltinos
and the Pascua Lama mine will continue to repeat itself.
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